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Abstract
The purpose of Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions (SSR) is twofold. On the one hand, he aims to displace the
goal-directed science-development model of the neopositivists,
and on the other, he wants to retain the idea of progress in
science. He states that the latter is analogous to that of Dar-
winian evolution. Here I will claim that Kuhn thinks about the
issue of evolution in a neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian way and
thus interprets the phenomenon of change in science as a (non–
developmental, non–goal-directed) temporal process. Neverthe-
less, trying to support Kuhn’s own science-development model
with a genuinely Darwinian theory (as I am putting forward
here) might be a fruitful and coherent project. In order to
do so, one has to interpret the theory of evolution in a non-
neopositivistic/non-Neo-Darwinian, indeed ’Kuhnian’ way, as it
is done in cybernetic and system-theoretical approaches which
displaced the neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian interpretation of
evolutionary theory at about the same time when Kuhn and oth-
ers displaced neopositivism in the philosophy of science. But,
since Kuhn is committed to the neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian
interpretation of the theory of evolution, we cannot regard his
work as a proper “evolutionary view of science”.
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1 Kuhn and Darwinism
1.1 A question arises
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) Kuhn argued
for the displacement of the goal-directed, teleological science-
development model of the neopositivists. In his “evolution-
ary view of science” the “evolution of the scientific ideas” is
called analogous to Darwinian evolution (SSR: 171-173). At the
same time, Kuhn states that the result of scientific evolution is
a non-cumulative, non–goal-directed, incommensurabilistic sci-
ence. But this result is in conflict with the Darwinian view of
science and culture. What is the source of the contradiction?
Before going into the details, let us take a closer look at
Kuhn’s Darwinian analogies. In the quotation below, we can
find both the developmental and the evolutionary tree analogies.
“The process described in Section XII as the resolution of rev-
olutions is the selection by conflict within the scientific commu-
nity of the fittest way to practice future science. The net result of
a sequence of such revolutionary selections, separated by peri-
ods of normal research, is the wonderfully adapted set of instru-
ments we call modern scientific knowledge. Successive stages
in that developmental process are marked by an increase in ar-
ticulation and specialization. And the entire process may have
occurred, as we now suppose biological evolution did, without
benefit of set goal, a permanent fixed scientific truth, of which
each stage in the development of scientific knowledge is a better
exemplar.” (SSR: 172-173.)
Kuhn states that the selection of scientific theories by scien-
tific revolutions leads to an evolutionary tree structure of science
and that the development of science is a non–goal-directed pro-
cess of change toward no goal which, in a paradoxical way, still
implies for him that scientific progress exists. In Kuhn’s surpris-
ing words: “That is not a relativist’s position, and it displays the
sense in which I am a convinced believer in scientific progress.”
(SSR: 206.)
1.2 What evolution and Darwinism are?
In the 19th century, evolutionary theories, as well as other
contemporary theories of nature, culture and science, were in-
fluenced by the notion of progress (e.g. Hegel, A. Comte,
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H. Spencer). Thus evolution meant a teleological process of
progress during which the highest evolved man necessarily de-
veloped from the primitive germ plasm of the beginnings. This
picture was significantly influenced by the phenomenon of on-
togeny where if the necessary conditions are given then an adult
human necessarily develops from the initial zygote because of
her DNA in which such general regularities work which unam-
biguously control and determine the stages, the process, and the
end of development.
The fundamental and important difference between these two
ways of development is that in the case of the theories of
progress, the development is determined by an absolute, exter-
nal principle – set by God, Nature, rationality or something else
– while in the case of ontogeny by a non-absolute, internal one
– set by evolution. Thus the earlier in contrast to the latter goes
towards an – absolute and external – goal, however, as we see
it in the case of the latter, there is no need of such goal to a
necessary, goal-directed development.
In contrast to the early evolutionists Darwin himself pursued
research only on those material mechanisms by which he could
explain the appearance of new species1 existence of which –
at least one of them – he originally supposed.2 In his work in
accordance with the contemporary Newtonian paradigm – and
in contrast with the theories of progress – he did not presume
any teleological principle in evolution as the early evolutionists
did. And because of this he avoided the use of the contemporary
concept of evolution – and substantiated a new one.
Darwin based his mechanism of natural selection on the
Malthusian demographical mathematical model where the re-
production follows a geometrical series while the development
of means of production is just linear thus the latter process re-
stricts the population-growth. In connection with the descent
of species it means that the environmental resources restrict the
increase of species – several newborn individuals will die well
before their maturity – thereby if there is difference between
the individuals, so there is variability, and if there is no suf-
ficient environmental resources, so there is a restricting factor
then the mechanism of natural selection begins to work and with
the extinction of individuals who are different in contrast to the
survivors the given species begin to change. This is the logi-
cal structure of natural selection from which two things follows.
First, the process of replication is not a precondition for natu-
ral selection only for the descent of species – reproduction is
the natural process of increasing – , and it works inside of one
generation if its preconditions – variability, restricting factor –
1see The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preserva-
tion of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Darwin, 1872)
2 “There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst
this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so
simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been,
and are being, evolved.” (Darwin, 1872: 429)
are given.3 Second, since both of the preconditions of the pro-
cess are contingent, – the different features of individuals are
the consequence of a random process and the conditions of en-
vironment and its changing are occasional – in the long run, the
natural selection itself will also be a contingent, changing pro-
cess from which no development follows. [7]
Then the followers of the Neo-Darwinian theory (e.g. T.
Dobzhanshy, J. Huxley, E. Mayr, etc.) which became the ruling
evolutionary theory of the 20th century took over both the mech-
anism of natural selection and the concept of evolution. In this
theory of evolution the mechanism of natural selection is com-
bined with the theory of genetics. This means, on the one hand,
that they connected the formation of different individuals with
the process of replication thereby they explained the occurrence
of variability4, and, on the other one, that they reduced the sub-
ject of evolutionary process to the genome5 [13, 19, 28]. How-
ever, the logical structure of the process has remained the same:6
the mechanism of natural selection is determined by the two
contingent factors of variability and of restricting insufficiency,
thus, the Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory has remained also
a contingent changing process from which naturally no develop-
ment follows. [10, 29, 30]
However, some critics of this view do not accept that the
mechanism of natural selection, a contingent, changing process
can explain any development in evolution, for example, Michael
Polányi, before SSR, states that Darwin did not only displace an
old, out-of-date teleological – absolute and external – principle
in the explanation of evolution but unfortunately he threw any
kind of necessary principle away. “Darwinism has diverted at-
tention for a century from the descent of man by investigating
the conditions of evolution and overlooking its action. Evolu-
tion can be understood only as a feat of emergence.” (Polányi,
1962: 390) [32]
At the same time, the Neo-Darwinians, of course, think that
they explained the development in evolution. Moreover, they in-
terpret it many times as a progress towards no goal – in contrast
to the teleological progress of the early evolutionists. See, for
example, Mayr’s Evolutionary Progress without Final Causes
subsection (Mayr, 1991: 62-65) [28], or in Francisco Ayala’s
words the natural selection is necessarily teleological in itself
(Ayala, 1998: 32-43) [2] only “the over-all process of evolution
cannot be said to be teleological in the sense of proceeding to-
wards certain specified goals. . . ” (Ayala, 1998: 42) [2].
So, “a good evolutionary theory is antidevelopmentalist and
antiteleological. . . ” [38]. However, on the other hand, the no-
3 As a matter of fact that in the case of many offspring the competitor is
not an individual from another species or an older one but another one from the
same generation or as well its littermate.
4So, the source of that became a lower level random physical chemical pro-
cess called mutation.
5 Or to the genes, as Dawkins, for example. [5]
6 Apart from that the formation of difference is now exclusively attached to
the birth of new generation.
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tion of progress and the teleological approach can be separated
from the idea of a cumulative, purely developmental and goal-
directed evolutionary process7, as this was shown by the cyber-
netics and system theories (e.g. Bertalanffy, Wiener, Ashby)
influence of which gradually displaced the neopositivistic/Neo-
Darwinian interpretation in evolutionary theories during the 60s
and 70s (see e.g. [1,3,4,46] ). Nowadays, we can find the influ-
ence of this novel interpretation of evolutionary theories – for
example – in the works of Michael Tomasello (1999; 2005),
[42, 43] Merlin Donald (1991) [14], Jared Diamond (1993;
1998)[11, 12] or Vilmos Csányi (1982) [6].8 But, of course,
the Neo-Darwinian interpretation of evolutionary theories is still
alive and dominant and we can find it in the works of such
great authors as George C. Williams (1966, 1992)[47], Richard
Dawkins (1976) [8], John Maynard Smith (1997) [27], Daniel
C. Dennett (1995) [9] or, naturally, Ernst Mayr (1991, 2001)
[29, 30].
1.3 The appearance of Kuhn in the field of the philosophy
of science
After the turn of the century and the First World War, the no-
tion of progress was pushed into the background and a sharp
demarcation criterion was suggested by the neopositivists, sep-
arating science from the rest of culture and nature. Within the
well-defined territory of science, neopositivists tried to save the
notion of progress and the possibility of an incessantly devel-
oping, cumulative and teleological science (e.g. R. Carnap, K.
Popper, etc.). Thus the evolutionary process – outside of the
range of the demarcation criterion – became a matter of simple
temporal change (see e.g. [34–36] ).
Then, in the 60s, Kuhn, who was a physicist and was in-
spired by his research on the history of natural science, displaced
the notion of goal-directed, continuous science-development as
proposed by the neopositivists.9 His work, however, remained
largely in the field of natural science.10 In the SSR, except for
a few examples mostly from chemistry, all his examples were
taken from physics. There is no sign that he was taking the new
interpretation of the theories of evolution – influenced by cyber-
netics and system theories – into consideration. When he refers
to Darwin and the theories of evolution, Kuhn thinks about them
7I think, in a sense, Kuhn has the same purpose when he states that the devel-
opment of science – with his paradoxical words: ‘the progress of science’ – is
analogous to the non-teleological and non-progress interpretation of evolution.
However, he draws a parallel between a process of development and a process of
change – according to the neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian interpretation of evo-
lution – that necessarily leads to contradiction.
8 In the third section I will put a more detailed picture of this interpretation
in connection with Kuhn’s developmental analogy.
9 Along with others, of course, e.g. Stephen Toulmin (1961) [44], Norwood
Russell Hanson (1961)[17] or later Paul Feyerabend (1997) [15].
10In the field of social science, the influence of the neopositivists was weaker,
thus, in accordance with that, there was little place for a critic against them.
In this field, the notion of progress remained a determinant one until the 60s
and 70s, when the influence of the new interpretation of evolutionary theories
displaced it.
in an old-fashioned neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian11 way and
interprets the evolution as a non-developing, non–goal-directed,
process of change towards no goal and contrasts it only with the
notion of progress (e.g. SSR: 171-173).
Naturally, the fact, that these two simultaneous events –
Kuhn’s appearance in philosophy and history of science and the
influence of Norbert Wiener and the cybernetics in evolutionary
theories and e.g. in cognitive psychology – were not acciden-
tal, but the consequence of the scientific, social and political
changes of the 40s, 50s and 60s after the shocking Second Word
War. In this sense, we can say that there was a ‘Kuhnian revo-
lution’ in evolutionary theories during the 60s and 70s, despite
the fact that Kuhn himself presumably did not recognize that.
And this latter is, I believe, the source of the contradictions and
confusions emerging in connection with the Darwinian interpre-
tations and analogies of SSR, since Kuhn himself, in contrast to
his physics and philosophy of science, in the case of the theory
of evolution, did not revise the prevailing neopositivistic/Neo-
Darwinian interpretation. This will be clear for us, for example,
in connection with the crucial concept of progress. Ernst Mayr,
the famous Neo-Darwinian, “Darwin of the 20th century”, in-
terprets the Neo-Darwinian evolutionary changing process as a
progress towards no goal exactly in the same way as Kuhn him-
self does.
1.4 Change or progress?
So, in SSR Kuhn argues with the neopositivists that there
are no universal, necessary standards in science which deter-
mine its goal and progress, only different, incommensurabilistic
paradigms – from which no goal and progress follow. How-
ever, he does not want to be a relativist, and, in a radically
new sense, tries to retain the idea of progress – as it appears
in Darwinian evolution (developmental analogy). But he thinks
about the issue of evolution in such a way that it means just
a “blind”, temporal process of change – a contingent mecha-
nism – and does not imply any determinable progress or devel-
opment.12 The instrumental character of this view is the reason
why the neopositivists – mainly Popper – think about this inter-
pretation affectively13, because they assert that there are univer-
sal, necessary standards in science which determine its goal and
progress and Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian natural selection is
simply the main, “blind” mechanism of this progress – selection
goes by universal standards (see e.g. the section III of Popper’s
The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions (1981: 84-87 [35])14).
11There is an interesting and important question why the neopositivistic and
Neo-Darwinian, and, of course, Kuhnian, interpretations of evolutionary theo-
ries are parallels, at least from our aspects, but in this paper we have no possibil-
ity to investigate it in detail and it has not an effect on my main argumentation
that Kuhn uses an inadequate evolutionary theory for his purpose.
12As we have seen it in the 1.2 subsection, natural selection is directed by two
random factors (conditions): mutations and the contingent environment. There
is no other fundamental principle in action in this interpretation of evolution.
13 Although this already follows from their demarcation criterion.
14 „Lowering the degree of ’blindness’.”
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However, and this is important, in Kuhn’s science-development
model there are no such universal and necessary standards but
entirely different, incommensurabilistic paradigms, thus, in this
case natural selection itself remains a goal-less instrument – se-
lection goes by the standardless scientific revolutions (e.g. see
the citation in the 1.1 subsection).
All these are clearly discernible from Carnap’s brief letter
written to Kuhn in 1962 after reading the completed manuscript
of SSR15:
„I found very illuminating the parallel you draw with Dar-
winian evolution: just as Darwin gave up the earlier idea that
the evolution was directed towards a predetermined goal, men
as the perfect organism, and saw it as a process of improve-
ment by natural selection, you emphasize that the development
of theories is not directed toward the perfect true theory, but is
a process of improvement of an instrument. In my own work
on inductive logic in recent years I have come to a similar idea:
that my work and that of a few friends in the step for step solu-
tion of problems should not be regarded as leading to “the ideal
system”, but rather as a step for step improvement of an instru-
ment. Before I read your manuscript I would not have put it in
just those words. But your formulations and clarifications by ex-
amples and also your analogy with Darwin’s theory helped me
to see clearer what I had in mind.” (Reisch, 1991: 267 [37]).
Carnap, who never dealt specifically with the idea of Dar-
winian evolution but interprets it as a process of change as does
Kuhn, at once recognizes the opportunity in Kuhn’s develop-
mental analogy for himself and for the neopositivists to explain
the mechanism of scientific progress. In this interpretation evo-
lution is going toward no (independent, external and absolute)
goal and thus it can be directed by internal, universal and neces-
sary standards and can be the main mechanism of science. Kuhn
interprets correctly that from the external, absolute principles
of the theories of progress and the internal, universal standards
of the neopositivists the same teleological, thus goal-directed,
progress follows – towards an absolute, external goal (“the ideal
system”) and directed by an internal, universal goal16 – , how-
ever, as I will put forward in this paper, he does not recognize
that goal-directedness is not the fundamental problem for him
but the external-absolute or internal-universal standards behind
it. He does not recognize it, because he interprets correctly
that from these two different principles the same teleological
progress follows only because, as a matter of fact, he under-
stands both of them as a teleological progress towards an abso-
lute, external goal. For him like for the Neo-Darwinians only
this contrasting is important.
So, non–teleological “scientific development is like Dar-
winian evolution, a process driven from behind rather than
pulled towards some fixed goal to which it goes ever close.”
(Kuhn, 2002: 115 [23]) But, as we see it, a “process driven
15 Which was interpreted by Kuhn as a “mere politeness” (Kuhn, 1993: 313)
[21]
16 The latter is parallel to the ontogeny! See it in the 1.2 subsection.
from behind” can be teleological, if there are independent, uni-
versal, necessary standards behind it and does not go towards
any “fixed goal” or truth. And, what is more, supposedly this
is why he does not recognize that for a non-relativistic, well-
determined notion of development – indeed, progress in a radi-
cally new sense – he has to define his own fundamental – but not
absolute and universal – principle which directs the progress or
development – or otherwise it remains a simple, temporal pro-
cess of change.17
1.5 After SSR
After SSR Kuhn’s point of view was significantly changed
in several aspects. For example, he stated that his “repeated
talk of gestalt switches” in SSR was a “mistake” (Kuhn, 1993:
328 [21]), so, the main importance of paradigm shifts would
be seen to be in the generation of new sciences, rather than in
the replacement of paradigms within the same speciality, and,
the concept of lexicon was introduced, thus, incommensurabil-
ity became “a growing conceptual disparity between the tools
deployed in the two specialities” (Kuhn, 2002: 120 [23]). These
mean in connection with our question that the parallel with Dar-
winian evolution needs to be made much stronger, the new sci-
entific specialities evolve as new species – thus, the evolutionary
tree analogy becomes more important in contrast to SSR. This
choice is entirely comprehensible and necessary because as we
will see (in the second section) the evolutionary tree analogy is
fruitful to clarify some problems and contradictions in contrast
to the developmental analogy (third section), however, it can not
explain the development in science (see 2.6 subsection) which
was Kuhn’s first intention when he turned to a Darwinian anal-
ogy in SSR (171-173).
Kuhn already wished before the 2nd edition of SSR that
“people took the {Darwinian} metaphor more seriously” (Kuhn,
1977: 508 [20]) but in his last interview he had to state that “no
one took it seriously” (Kuhn, 2002: 307 [24]). The secondary
literature does not understand Kuhn’s work from a Darwinian
point of view based on his evolutionary analogy (see e.g. Fuller,
2000; Hoyningen-Huene, 1993; Bird, 2000 [5,16,18]) or if they
try – at least in part – they do not find it appropriate, for example,
Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read find it “entirely unpersuasive,
and unnecessary” (Sharrock, 2002: 193)[40]. Elevating excep-
tion is the work of Hungarian author János Laki, at the same
time, he also uses the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection
only to describe the micro processes of scientific change in the
scientific community [26] and not to define the macro develop-
ment of science in accordance with Kuhn’s first intention.
However, I believe that the idea of supporting Kuhn’s science-
development model with a Darwinian theory – and with not only
a simple analogy – might be a fruitful and consistent one, but
in order to do so, one has to interpret the theory of evolution
in a non-neopositivistic/Non–Neo-Darwinian, indeed ’Kuhnian’
17 As it is argued, for example, by Polányi (1962) [32]. Natural selection is in
itself just a “condition” of evolution and not its principle (“action”).
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way, as it is done by the cybernetic and system-theoretical ap-
proaches, and, of course, an evolutionary theory of this kind has
to define the principle of progress or development for the Kuh-
nian science-development model.18
So, in the second section, I will examine Kuhn’s evolution-
ary tree analogy which can be useful to clarify some prob-
lems and contradictions in SSR but which can not be suffi-
cient in itself to explain the development in science. Then,
in the third section, the developmental analogy and the prob-
lem of goal-directedness will be investigated which in turn will
help us to understand Kuhn’s interpretation of Darwinian evo-
lutionary theory. In order to achieve this, for the problem of
goal-directedness we will draw an analogy between the Kuh-
nian criticism of the traditional, neopositivistic interpretation
of the Newtonian paradigm and our Darwinian criticism of the
neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian interpretation of the Darwinian
evolutionary theory, used by Kuhn without proper care and be-
cause of that he could not reach his goal to successfully explain
the development in science.
2 The evolutionary tree analogy
2.1 The problem of general values and persistent
paradigms
Kuhn asserts two different statements about paradigms. On
the one hand – and this is the more eye-catching – he attaches
the components of the disciplinary matrix to the different scien-
tific paradigms which are held incommensurable without unam-
biguous ‘passages’ amongst them. But on the other hand, Kuhn
states clearly that within the different paradigms there also exist
general scientific values – “. . . they do much to provide a sense
of community to natural scientists as a whole (SSR: 184)” – e.g.:
“. . . theories: they must, first and foremost, permit puzzle-
formulation and solution; where possible they should be simple,
self-consistent, and plausible, compatible, that is, with current
theories deployed. (. . . ) . . . predictions: they should be accu-
rate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones;
whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consis-
tently satisfied in a given field; and so on.” (SSR: 185.)
How is it possible that the paradigms are incommensurable
and the general scientific values are not?
Analogously to this, the question arises, how we can speak
about the transition to a new paradigm – e.g. in the case of
Priestley and Lavoisier – when Kuhn clearly asserts that, at the
same time, the Newtonian paradigm, of universal validity, re-
mains unchanged until the end of the transition?
We may find answers to these contradictions from Kuhn’s
own evolutionary tree analogy if we take a closer look.
18 As it was required by Polányi who stated that the ordering principle of evo-
lution was the “potentiality of stable open system” (Polányi, 1962: 384 [32]).
Thus in his philosophy the idea of evolution is not only an analogy but a funda-
mental base.
2.2 The tree of science
We have seen that Kuhn states that there exist general sci-
entific values which “provide a sense of community to natural
scientists as a whole”. This could mean that there are two lev-
els of paradigms. First, the higher level of the general paradigm
of science, determined by the general scientific values and sec-
ond, the lower level of particular scientific paradigms, which are
equal and incommensurable. But, since the different paradigms
branch out from each other as the branches of an evolutionary
tree (SSR: 205), the picture is much more complicated than that.
Kuhn identifies the different specialities, scientific communi-
ties and paradigms as follows (SSR: 176-177).
“A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community
share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men
who share a paradigm. (. . . ) Scientific communities can and
should be isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the lat-
ter can then be discovered by scrutinizing the behaviour of a
given community’s members. (. . . ) Most practicing scientists
respond at once to questions about their community affiliations,
taking for granted that responsibility for the various current spe-
cialities is distributed among groups of at least roughly deter-
minate membership. (. . . ) A scientific community consists, on
this view, of the practitioners of a scientific speciality.”19 (SSR:
176-177)
And, “. . . communities in this sense exist, of course, at nu-
merous levels. The most global is the community of all natural
scientists. . . ”, which is the trunk of the evolutionary tree and
which is held together by the general scientific values. “At only
a slightly lower level the main scientific professional groups are
communities: physicists, chemists, astronomers, zoologists, and
the like.” Which are the main branches of the evolutionary tree
and which are separated by the main specialities of current sci-
ence. Then, at even a more lower level, there are the more im-
portant subgroups, e.g. “organic chemists, and perhaps protein
chemists among them, solid-state and high-energy physicists,
radio astronomers and so on.” (SSR: 177.)
There is no need to continue this, to recall more details of
Kuhn’s evolutionary tree analogy, or to examine whether he de-
scribes scientific specialities rightly. The point of interest for
us is that it is clear from these quotations that the different
paradigms derive from each other, according to their importance
and validity, by the selection mechanism of scientific revolu-
tions.
We can also find the same picture of the structure of science
to be present in the case of the exemplars, when Kuhn says that:
“All physicists, for example, begin by learning the same ex-
emplars. . . As their training develops, however, the symbolic
generalizations they share are increasingly illustrated by dif-
ferent exemplars. Though both solid-state and field-theoretic
physicists share the Schrödinger equation, only its more elemen-
19 In the same place, this classification is called by Kuhn: „the intuitive notion
of community.”
Kuhn’s Darwinism – from a darwinian point of view 352007 15 1
tary applications are common to both groups.” (SSR: 187.)
He also claims that “more than other sorts of components of
the disciplinary matrix, differences between sets of exemplars
provide the community fine-structure of science.”20 (SSR: 187.)
2.3 The new sense of paradigm
This may be true in the case of applying the notion to shared
scientific theories – we have seen this above. However, the dif-
ferent scientific specialities have not just shared but also un-
shared scientific theories, by which one can traditionally differ-
entiate them from each other. Of course, this is not too amazing
since without such unshared scientific theories there wouldn’t
exist different scientific specialities at all. Kuhn himself, how-
ever, is interested in the new sense of paradigm and not in the
well-known distinctive role of scientific theories.
The old sense of paradigm, which is later called ‘disciplinary
matrix’ in the postscript of the second edition of SSR, also in-
cludes the scientific theories, but the new sense of paradigm,
which is much more important for Kuhn, is only the fourth sort
of element of the disciplinary matrix, namely, the ‘exemplars’
(SSR: 186-187). (The first three are the ‘symbolic generaliza-
tions’, ‘metaphysical paradigms’ and ‘values’ (SSR: 182-184).)
So Kuhn is interested in neither the scientific theories nor the
disciplinary matrix – paradigms in the old sense – but in the
exemplars – paradigms in the new sense – and their importance
and distinctive role in the life of scientific communities. In other
words, he is not interested in the distinctive role, evolutionary
tree structure and descent of scientific theories but instead of the
conceptual roles and application methods of the mechanism of
science which are determined by the exemplars.21
Consequently, in the case which we have seen above, Kuhn
also concentrates only on the distinctive role of the exemplars,
whereas the tree structure of science is of no significance for
him. And it follows from this point that it is not here that the
evolutionary analogy and the tree structure of science appear in
Kuhn’s thinking. These two analogies are instead just ingredi-
ents of an intuitive answer to the above-mentioned questions.
And they are not elaborated and are not contemplated because
of Kuhn’s essentially different interest.22
2.4 General paradigmatic values
Before drawing our conclusion, it is worth stopping here. Al-
though the general scientific values are given a prominent place
20 May be it is worth noticing that in contrast to the previous quotation –
which is 10 pages earlier in the SSR – here the scientific community is formed
by all the physicists.
21 This interest remains also the same after SSR when he describes the evolv-
ing of new specialities as a narrowing process of the lexical structure.
22 The evolutionary analogies are also problematic because of their biological
nature, since the development of science is, of course, not a biological but a
cultural process with a very different heredity mechanism. The source of the
accidental successfulness of the biological analogies is that in the case of natural
science – to which the SSR only refers – the final subjects are not cultural as in
the case of biological evolution.
in the structure of science by Kuhn, they are also not elaborated
because of his different interest.
We have already seen Kuhn’s examples at the beginning of the
second section. However, in a sense, the first sort of element of
the disciplinary matrix (‘symbolic generalizations’) belongs to
these general values, because every paradigm of natural science
uses symbolic generalizations when formalizing scientific theo-
ries. And what may be more important is mathematizing them.
In Kuhn’s view, in the Antiquity, paradigms have emerged in
those branches of science where the application of mathematics
– of course, not in a modern sense – was already at an advanced
level, e.g.: astronomy, ancient statics, dynamics and geometrical
optics (SSR: 15-16.).
Margaret Morrison states that the applications of mathematics
and mathematical formalism have key importance in unifying
different scientific theories (Morrison, 2000: 193.)[31] Kuhn’s
excellent example for this is Newton’s unifying the celestial and
the terrestrial mechanics.23.
Beyond mathematics, the general scientific values of interest
include logic whose fundamental theorems are explicitly or im-
plicitly used by all the natural sciences.
2.5 Conclusion of the evolutionary tree analogy
So there are two possibilities for a new branch of science to
evolve:
1 The specialization of a given higher level branch of science –
‘main paradigm’ – into a lower level branch of science (e.g.
SSR: 172.).
2 The linking of some lower level branches of science into a
higher level branch of science. (This does not mean the end
for the lower level branches of science, just the development
of a main overall paradigm, e.g. SSR: 15, 95.).
Thus, for example, the influence of Newton’s Principia on
chemistry and the corpuscular standards at the end of the 18th
century is in accordance with the first possibility, while its deci-
sive role in physics the end of the 17th and the first half of the
18th centuries is in accordance with the second possibility.
So, the evolutionary tree structure of paradigms allows a com-
parison of the different paradigms with each other via the gen-
eral scientific values. However, this does not mean that the
paradigms at the same level would be commensurable (consider
e.g. Lavoisier’s and Priestley’s theories) or that any values or
general values exist outside any sorts of paradigm. There are no
23 Though Morrison’s example is not the Principia but The Origin of Species
in which this key role is performed by the Malthusian demographical mathemat-
ical model. (The reproduction, as we have seen in the 1.2 subsection, follows
a geometrical series while the development of means of production is just lin-
ear and the natural selection put an end to this difference – forming a given
species, ecological system or population by the process.) The application of
the Malthusian model made it possible for the Darwinian evolutionary theory to
unify several disciplines and their consequences: geology, palaeontology, geog-
raphy, morphology, embryology, etc. (Morrison, 2000: 192-209[31])
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universal, necessary standards or values – as in the theories of
the neopositivists – ; a value within a paradigm can function as a
general value just because it has general validity over the lower
level, derived paradigms and although we can find it within ev-
ery lower level, derived paradigms it still are determined by the
higher level paradigm.24
The evolutionary tree analogy can also explain how a
paradigm can remain unchanged while, at the same time, there is
a transition to a new paradigm. The unchanged and the changing
paradigms are not at the same level – as we have seen this possi-
bility in the case of Lavoisier, whose work on chemistry induced
a change of paradigm while the main Newtonian paradigm re-
mained unchanged.
Consequently, the evolutionary tree analogy is fruitful in
the case of explanation of a few Kuhnian problems and con-
tradictions; however, Kuhn is not interested in the old sense
of paradigm and the tree structure of scientific theories but in
the distinctive role of the exemplars, mostly in the case of the
same-level-paradigms, which, in accordance with their mean-
ing, follow each other by the process of scientific revolutions.
It is important to make it clear that the evolutionary tree anal-
ogy is not the revolutionary point of the criticism of Kuhn, and
that these occasional explanations are not in the centre of his
interest in SSR.
2.6 The evolutionary tree analogy after SSR
After SSR Kuhn uses the fruitful evolutionary tree analogy
to describe the pattern of scientific development as a gradual
proliferation of specialities (see e.g. [21, 25] ). However the
parallel is not entirely sufficient because of some problems and
disanalogies. First of all, what is acknowledged by Kuhn him-
self, “revolutions directly displace some of the concepts basic
to the earlier practice in a field in favor of others, a destructive
element not nearly so directly present in biological speciation.”
(Kuhn, 2002: 120 [23]). This means also that specialities do
not only evolve but diminish too. Consider Priestley’s chem-
istry which was displaced by Lavoisier’s one according to the
ruling Newtonian paradigm, that is, the latter one, an evolving
speciality of the ruling paradigm displaced the earlier one which
was not its speciality. The same influence of the ruling Newto-
nian paradigm took place in biology in the 19th century because
of Darwin’s theory of natural selection which was also in accor-
dance with the Newtonian paradigm in lots of aspects in contrast
to the theories of the early evolutionists. So, the question is: is
there only one tree of science? – Are the Ptolemaen and the
Copernican astronomy in the same tree of science? If they are
then of what specialities they are? – Because there is only one
evolutionary tree.
Secondly, from Kuhn’s point of view the evolutionary niches
do not determine unambiguously the process of selection.25 “Is
24 Completely analogous to this as Sankey thinks that the different, – on the
same, lower level still – incommensurable lexicons of theories are comparable
in the – higher – level of natural language as metalanguage (Sankey, 1998) [39].
25So, they are not only occasional but, moreover, do not determine the way of
it the creature who adopts to the word or does the word adopt to
the creatures?”, asks Kuhn, and then he answers that: “What ac-
tually evolve creatures and niches together.” (Kuhn, 2002: 102
[25]) Kuhn has right that there is a tight, mutual connection be-
tween species and their environment but the consequence of it is
not necessarily a kind of relativism – which naturally does not
explain any development in science – where “the world is our
representation of our niche” (Kuhn, 2002: 103[25]) and thus
radically different for us because we are inhabitants of radically
and necessarily different and changing niches. However to that,
we have to understand these tight and mutual connections and
the roles of niches as a complex, multilevelled evolutionary sys-
tem (see e.g. [6]) and then we can explain the development in
nature – and in science – , as we will see it in the third sec-
tion. Analogous case to this as Kuhn draws a parallel between
a gene pool of a species and a lexicon of a scientific special-
ity. The gene pool is in itself “a sort of individual of which the
members of the species are parts. I am persuaded that this exam-
ple contains important clues to the sense in which science is in-
trinsically a community activity.” (Kuhn, 1993: 329[21]) From
the system-theoretical approaches this questionable parallel be-
comes unambiguous because there are unambiguously identifi-
able individuals in the different higher system levels (see e.g.
[6] ), and thus a cultural group – as well a scientific community
– can be an identifiable individual above the level of individual
human persons. See, for example, Merlin Donald’s “collective
conceptual ‘model”’ (Donald. 1991: e.g. 173[14]).
Finally, the most important thing is that the proliferation of
species – the growing complexity – in itself can not explain any
development in evolution, thus, in science, it is just a pattern
which describes the process. The specification in evolution does
not follow necessarily from the theory of natural selection or
from the Neo-Darwinian theory. The natural selection can lead
to lesser complexity and to lesser specification (see e.g. Darwin,
1872: 99-10026; Maynard Smith, 1997: 4-5; Mayr, 2001: 278-
79[7, 27, 28]).27
Kuhn himself words the question: “what is the process by
which proliferation and lexical change take place?” And an-
swers that “my views remain very close to those developed in
Structure.” (Kuhn, 1993: 337[21]). This leads us back to the
developmental analogy with which Kuhn tries to explain the de-
velopment in science.
adaptation.
26 „In some cases variations or individual differences of a favourable nature
may never have arisen for natural selection to act on and accumulate. In no case,
probably, has time sufficed for the utmost possible amount of development. In
some few cases there has been what we must call retrogression of organisation.
But the main cause lies in the fact that under very simple conditions of life a high
organisation would be of no service, – possibly would be of actual disservice,
as being of a more delicate nature, and more liable to be put out of order and
injured.” (Darwin, 1872: 99-100 [7])
27 Moreover, a living being’s purposeful structure is not simply a matter of
complexity (Polányi, 1969: 228)[32].
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3 The developmental analogy
3.1 Kuhn’s Darwinism
As we have seen it in the case of the tree analogy, Darwinian
analogies can clarify a few problems and contradictions in the
SSR. However, if we want to understand the main role of these
analogies in the SSR, we have to ask just exactly where and
for what purpose they appear in Kuhn’s thinking, and what he
means by Darwinism.
Kuhn refers to Darwin by name on the last pages of the first
edition of SSR (SSR: 171-172). He states that his own science-
development model is analogous to the Darwinian evolution in a
sense that none of them is goal-directed – in contrast to the evo-
lutionary theories before Darwin, and the science-development
models of the neopositivists.
“For many men the abolition of that teleological kind of evo-
lution was the most significant and least palatable of Darwin’s
suggestion. The Origin of Species recognized no goal set ei-
ther by God or nature. Instead, natural selection, operating in
the given environment and with the actual organisms presently
at hand, were responsible for the gradual but steady emergence
of more elaborate, further articulated, and vastly more special-
ized organisms. Even such marvellously adapted organs as the
eye and hand of man – organs whose design had previously pro-
vided powerful arguments for the existence of a supreme artifi-
cer and an advance plan – were products of a process that moved
steadily from primitive beginnings but toward no goal.” (SSR:
172)
But he also states that:
“The developmental process described in this essay has been
a process of evolution from primitive beginnings – a process
whose successive stages are characterized by increasingly de-
tailed and refined understanding of nature.” (SSR: 170)
Beyond doubt Kuhn thinks that this process ‘from primitive
beginnings’ towards an ‘increasingly detailed and refined under-
standing of nature’ is at the time not goal-directed, as he thinks
the same about the Darwinian evolution, where this ‘increas-
ingly detailed and refined understanding of nature’ is not iden-
tical with the well defined goal of the evolution of science.28
So, we have to ask what the source of this contradiction is, why
Kuhn thinks that the Darwinian evolution is an appropriate anal-
ogy and finally, what he means under a goal-directed process.
I state here that the Darwinian evolution is goal-directed but,
of course, not in the same sense as the theories of progress –
or the ontogeny – are goal-directed. The main difference be-
tween them is that in the case of the Darwinian evolution – and,
of course, the development of science – there is no necessary,
28 Maybe it is worth noticing that, as we have seen in the end of the 1.4
subsection, the term of „toward a goal” can be misleading in a sense that the
„increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature” is not an explicit,
external goal – as that is in the theories of progress – toward which literally the
development of science is going but a goal comes from the inside (universal,
necessary) structure of science – as that in the ontogeny – in this sense it is
determinedly goal-directed.
independent developmental pattern or principle – universal sci-
entific standards – which determines the direction and stages
– paradigms and scientific revolutions – of the developmental
process. In this case, the direction and stages of the develop-
mental process are determined by the subjects of the develop-
mental process, for example, by an ecological system and its
parts – or in the case of science the social and technical back-
grounds. In contrast to this, in the case of the evolutionary
theories of E. B. Taylor, L. H. Morgan and H. Spencer which
were influenced by the theories of progress, – or in the case of
the neopositivistic science-development models (R. Carnap, K.
Popper, etc.) – , there always exists an independent, necessary
developmental pattern or principle – universal scientific stan-
dards – , which determines the outcomes of evolutionary pro-
cesses and the subjects of these processes are also subordinated
to this independent, necessary developmental pattern or princi-
ple. In other words, these processes are not just goal-directed as
in the Darwinian evolution and the development of science but
their goals are determined by an independent, necessary pattern
or principle – set by God, nature, rationality or something else
– thus these processes – and the development of science in the
neopositivistic theories – become a process of progress.
Kuhn does not see the difference between the two kinds of
processes and he thinks that Darwinian evolution is not goal-
directed at all. This, however, is not acceptable for a Darwinian.
3.2 The difference between Newtonian physics and the
Darwinian theory of evolution
It is worth examining how the evolutionary theory of Dar-
win became an accepted scientific theory and how it was reinter-
preted in the general Newtonian paradigm ruling at that time. In
this, we ask for Kuhn’s help who discerningly sheds light on the
reinterpretation of the Newtonian paradigm when it had become
an accepted scientific theory according to the dominant mecha-
nistic view of science. So, due to Kuhn, we are able to draw a
clear analogy between the two scientific reinterpretations.
We have already seen in the 1.2 subsection and in the 24th
footnote that the source of the success of the Darwinian theory
was that Darwin cleverly applied the Malthusian demographic
mathematical model to natural selection – the main process of
his scientific theory. Thus, according to the ruling general New-
tonian paradigm, natural selection became a causal mechanism
which could unify several very different scientific specialities
and their consequences, and which provided and has been pro-
viding the fundamental explanatory strength of the Darwinian
theory (Morrison, 2000: 202-206 [31]). But, at first, this did
not mean that the theory of Darwin was accepted as true, it just
meant that it was accepted as a (possible) scientific theory.
However, the causal mechanism of natural selection is not the
same that the causal mechanism of Newtonian physics.
“Darwin’s theory of natural selection came very late in the
history of thought. Was it delayed because it opposed revealed
truth, because it was entirely new subject in the history of sci-
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ence, because it was characteristic only of living things, or be-
cause it dealt with purpose and final causes without postulating
an act of creation? I think not. Darwin discovered the role of
selection, a kind of causality very different from the push-pull
mechanisms of science up to that time.” (Skinner, 1974: 40-
41 [40])
What is the main difference between the two kinds of causal
mechanisms? The answer is that the Darwinian causal mecha-
nism is not necessarily active (e.g. Darwin: 1879, 68-69 [7]).
An apple, according to the theory of gravitation, if coming off
from a branch of an apple tree, in any case will fall down to the
ground and we can predict and draw exactly its trajectory and
what is more, the gravitational force is active in every situation
(place and time) thus also in the case when the branch of the
tree is holding strongly the apple. But, according to the Dar-
winian theory of natural selection, in the case of an ecological
system, we cannot do the same, we cannot predict exactly how,
for example, the composition of the species in a given ecological
system will change and furthermore when one of its fundamen-
tal condition is not appropriate,29 the natural selection is simply
not active.
So, the theory of gravitation is a necessary, universal law and
in every cases active but the theory of natural selection is just a
statistical regularity and only at certain times active. In Popper
words: “There are no Darwinian laws of evolution.” (Popper,
1983: 267[34])30 Exactly this is just how the causal mechanism
of evolution is directed by the contingent regularities of the evo-
lutionary system.
Thus, contrary to the theory of gravitation, the causal mech-
anism of evolution does not come into force necessarily in the
same way in different but similar cases:
“We have seen that in two beings widely remote from each
other in the natural scale, organs serving for the same purpose
and in external appearance closely similar may have been sep-
arately and independently formed; but when such organs are
closely examined, essential differences in their structure can al-
most always be detected; and this naturally follows from the
principle of natural selection. On the other hand, the common
rule throughout nature is infinite diversity of structure for gain-
ing the same end; and this again naturally follows from the same
great principle.” (Darwin, 1872: 165 [7])
In other words, the process of evolution is influenced by in-
ternal and external contingencies – biological mutation, the fun-
damental component of biological evolution, of course, is also
of this kind. In the case of gravitation, there are no such internal
or external contingences just an independent, universal law.
And what had been the situation before the Darwinian theory
29 There are no different variations or environmental pressure.
30 „Darwin’s discovery of the theory of natural selection has often been com-
pared to Newton’s discovery of the theory of gravitation. This is a mistake. New-
ton formulated a set of universal laws intended to describe the interaction, and
consequent behaviour, of the physical universe. Darwin’s theory of evolution
proposed no such universal laws. There are no Darwinian laws of evolution.”
was accepted? In The Origin of Species Darwin complains of
this in the following way:
“It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active
power or Deity; but who objects to an author speaking of the
attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets?”
(Darwin, 1872: 63[7])
In other words, while the evolutionary theory of Darwin had
not been accepted as a (possible) scientific theory according to
the ruling Newtonian paradigm, Darwin had been accused that
his selection mechanism was a kind of occult, teleological force.
But note that Newton was also accused with the same guilt be-
cause of his gravitational force. And it is Kuhn himself who dis-
cusses this in detail in the SSR and reaches thought-provoking
consequences. It is worth examining and trying to comprehend
this Kuhnian criticism because it will make clearer what the
problem with the interpretation of the Darwinian evolutionary
theory of Kuhn is, and in an analogical way, it will make possi-
ble a similar criticism on Kuhn himself in connection with the
notion of goal-directedness.
“Gravity, interpreted as an innate attraction between every
pair of particles of matter, was an occult quality in the same
sense as the scholastics’ ‘tendency to fall’ had been. There-
fore, while the standard of corpuscularism remained in effect,
the search for a mechanical explanation of gravity was one of
the most challenging problems for those who accepted the Prin-
cipia as paradigm. Newton devoted much attention to it and so
did many of his eighteenth-century successors. The only ap-
parent option was to reject Newton’s theory for its failure to
explain gravity, and that alternative, too, was widely adopted.
Yet neither of these views ultimately triumphed. Unable either
to practice science without the Principia or to make that work
conform to the corpuscular standards of the seventeenth century,
scientists gradually accepted the view that gravity was indeed in-
nate. By the mid-eighteenth century that interpretation had been
almost universally accepted, and the result was a genuine rever-
sion (which is not the same as a retrogression) to a scholastic
standard. Innate attractions and repulsions joined size, shape,
position, and motion as physically irreducible primary proper-
ties of matter.” (SSR: 105-106)
This Kuhnian criticism calls our attention to the reinter-
pretation of the Newtonian paradigm and the notion of goal-
directedness, since before this reinterpretation the gravitational
force had been held for an occult, teleological, goal-directed
mechanism – from the then ruling mechanical viewpoint of sci-
ence. But after the reinterpretation, the mechanical view of sci-
ence became more permissible and it was reconciled with the
Newtonian theory of gravity.
So the traditional, neopositivistic contrast is the following:
Aristotelian world view Newtonian paradigm
goal-directed not goal-directed
there is an occult,
teleological force there is no occult force
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But on the basis of the Kuhnian criticism the contrast becomes
a little bit subtler:
Aristotelian world view Mechanical world view
goal-directed not goal-directed
there is an occult,
teleological force there is no occult force
Newtonian paradigm
goal-directed31
(in a radically new sense)32
which is a result of
a (non-occult) force
It is important to emphasize that giving up the earlier, harder
interpretation of the mechanical world view – which did not ac-
cept any innate attraction between particles and which regarded
both the Newtonian paradigm and the Aristotelian world view
to be an occult, teleological theory – and the “genuine reversion
to a scholastic standard” do not signify a step back for Kuhn
but rather a significant and scientifically successful step forward,
that is the creation of a kind of synthesis between the old Aris-
totelian world view as thesis and the mechanical world view of
science as antithesis.
In the same way, after the accusations of the 19th century, the
same kind of developmental road in the history of science was
taken again in connection with Darwin’s notion of natural selec-
tion. But, of course, the latter was not classified into the same
primary properties as the gravitational force but was reduced
later into complex physical and biological processes of individ-
ual entities (genes) – this was the source of the Neo-Darwinian
synthesis (see it in the 1.2 subsection).
All this, however, should not deceive us. Kuhn was not de-
ceived either by the reinterpretation of the gravitation force in
the middle of the 18th century. So, without examining the prob-
lems of goal-directedness and teleology any further, we can ac-
cept that after the interpretational turn, gravitation was no more
an occult, teleological force and analogously that, after the First
World War, Darwinian natural selection was also not any more
seen as an occult, teleological force. 33
31See its consequence e.g. in Newton’s first letter to Bentley (Turnbull, 1961:
234).
32We might differentiate between the two senses of goal-directedness in the
following way: in the case of the Aristotelian world view call it teleological
goal-directedness but in the case of the Newtonian paradigm just a simple goal-
directedness.
33It is worth mentioning, however, that the non-teleological notion of natural
selection is not acceptable for several contemporary writers too because other-
wise it could not be the explanation of any purposeful thing. (See e.g. Polányi,
1962: 345-435 [32]) “The complicated anatomy of the eye like the exact func-
tioning of the kidney are the result of a nonrandom process – natural selection.”
(Ayala, 1998: 35[2]) But, of course, from the point of view of the system theo-
ries it has not to be teleological only goal-directed (see the next subsection).
3.3 The goal-directedness of evolution and the develop-
mental analogy
The reinterpretation of the Darwinian theory does not mean
that natural selection and the evolutionary process are not goal-
directed, as Kuhn himself admits. It just means that the notion of
goal-directedness has been radically changed in the Darwinian
theory to divert from the meaning of the term in the classic the-
ories of progress and in the theories of the neopositivists. For
example, Darwin himself emphasizes over and over again this
goal-directedness of natural selection when, in connection with
his several examples, he talks about how different species, or-
gans and ecological systems change in a specific, directed way
according to the given environmental relations. (E.g. Darwin,
1872: 64; 349-350; 401, also see the quotation earlier in subsec-
tion 3.2.[7]).
Kuhn, however, although criticizing it heavily elsewhere, here
employs solely the meaning of goal-directedness as it is in use
in the old theories of progress and the neopositivists. And, of
course, from this uncare point of view, his conclusion is abso-
lutely right that in his sense natural selection and the evolution-
ary process are not goal-directed.
As a result, Kuhn in his evolutionary analogy contrasts his
own science-development model with that of the neopositivists
in the following way:
Neopositivistic science- Kuhnian science-
development models development model
Theories of progress34 Darwinian evolutionary theory
goal-directed not goal-directed
This is analogous to the traditional, neopositivistic contrast-
ing of the Newtonian paradigm and the Aristotelian world view.
Applying the Kuhnian criticism in an analogous way, as it has
been applied in the above case, Kuhn’s latter contrasting of the
theory of evolution and the notion of goal-directedness also be-
come a little bit subtler:
Neopositivistic science- Kuhnian science-
development models development models
Theories of progress Relativistic culture-
development models
goal-directed not goal-directed
which is a result of an independent,
necessary developmental pattern or
principle
Darwinian evolutionary theories35
goal-directed (in a radically new sense)
which is a result of the development of a
complex system possessing multiple
feedbacks
34Kuhn mentions H. Spencer and J.-B. Lamarck by name.
35Or a Darwinian evolutionary interpretation of the Kuhnian model – in this
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In short, the Darwinian evolutionary process differs from
both the theories of progress (considered as genuinely goal-
directed) and from the physical processes (considered as not
goal-directed) in that its coming into force is determined by
not independent, strict and universal laws but by individual and
statistical law-like regularities, and that the goal and direction
and stages of its development are not independent from their
subjects. In the words of cybernetics and system theories, the
process of evolution is not a simple, linear process of change,
composed of individual, independent entities, but is a complex
developmental process of multiple feedbacks, composed of many
combined, multi-levelled, multi-connected, essentially different
entities and its determining principle is not a universal law but
an individual, specific stable open system.
All this, of course, were emphasized by Darwin himself,
when he said that the different species are connected with each
other in several, very complicated ways in the complex ecolog-
ical systems, and that the process of natural selection, accord-
ing to the wide biological and environmental conditions and cir-
cumstances, is understandable only within these complex sys-
tems. See e.g. in the Complex relations of all Animals and
Plants to each other in the Struggle for Existence subchapter
(Darwin, 1872: 55-59 [7]). And this is the reason why I spoke
about a change of an ecological system earlier in the case of
my evolutionary example and not about how the giraffe’s neck
was lengthened. The latter would be simply misleading. And,
of course, this does not mean that Darwin himself was already
thinking in a complete system theory36 but his words are point-
ing at this direction.
The difference between the two interpretations of the no-
tion of goal-directedness – the one of Darwin and the later
neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian interpretation accepted by Kuhn
without careful consideration – is more striking if we put the
words of Darwin and the words of Kuhn quoted earlier beside
each other. 37 Kuhn asserts that in The Origin of Species there
exists no goal set by nature instead natural selection operates in
the given environment, while Darwin himself says in The Origin
of Species that the infinite diversities of structure for gaining the
same end naturally follows from the principle of natural selec-
tion. The words of Kuhn, of course, rely on his thinking of the
notion of goal-directedness in a neopositivistic way – for him it
can mean only a teleogical notion in the old sence – and not in
the very different Darwinian sense.
For Kuhn, the confrontation of natural selection with a goal
set by God (or nature) is important, but remember the words of
Skinner: the main difference is not this by itself, but the new
case the evolutionary approach, of course, is not taken in a neopositivistic/Neo-
Darwinian sense.
36 His interest was radically different as Kuhn himself was not interested in
the old sense of paradigm and in the tree structure of scientific theories only in
the distinctive role of the exemplars (see it in the 2.5 subsection).
37 Kuhn’s words were quoted in the beginning of 3.1 subsection, while Dar-
win’s in the middle of 3.2.
kind of causality, because the natural selection “came very late
in the history of thought” (where exists no God in the processes
of Newtonian physics any more).
3.4 Conclusions
To summarize the above, because of his somewhat careless
consideration Kuhn uses the neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian in-
terpretation of evolutionary theory and thus he cannot distin-
guish between the two notions of goal-directedness. There-
fore, his developmental analogy (in contrast to his evolution-
ary tree analogy) is not acceptable in Darwinian approach, since
it cannot explain the contradiction between Kuhn’s belief in
scientific progress (e.g. SSR: 206) and the fact that he, sim-
ilarly to that in Darwinian evolution, does not interpret sci-
entific progress as a goal-directed development, just as a pro-
cess of change. And he also cannot explain in what sense he
speaks about a scientific “process whose successive stages are
characterized by increasingly detailed and refined understand-
ing of nature” (SSR: 170). So, if Kuhn’s aim is to displace
the science-development models of the neopositivists, he can-
not ask for help from the same neopositivistic/Neo-Darwinian
interpretation of the Darwinian evolutionary theory but should
turn to the non-neopositivistic/non–Neo-Darwinian cybernetic
and system-theoretical approaches of evolution which are goal-
directed in the new sense38 and the progress or development in
science is definable by them.
From a Darwinian point of view of science, the development
of science is not just analogous to the process of evolution but, as
we have seen examples for that, itself is a (cultural) evolutionary
process. And, among other things, this is a goal-directed, cumu-
lative and incommensurabilistic, developmental process, but, of
course, not in the above discussed neopositivistic sense,39 so it
is not determined by some independent and necessary princi-
ples – e.g. universal scientific standards – , but by wider, not
independent social and cultural processes, and by biological and
environmental conditions and circumstances40 at the end by the
specific evolutionary system of the Earth. All this, in a sense,
is parallel with Kuhn’s social-constructivism, yet because of his
fundamentally different interpretation of the theory of evolution
and its limited application in SSR, in contrast to his intentions,
we cannot regard his work as a proper “evolutionary view of
science”.
4 Summary
In my paper, I have argued that the idea of supporting Kuhn’s
science-development model with a Darwinian theory (against
the science-development model of the neopositivists) might be a
fruitful and coherent project – as it is in the case of the evolution-
ary tree analogy – , but to that end, one has to interpret the theory
38 Or goal-directed but not teleological.
39See its application for example in [1, 2, 14, 41]
40It is quite telling that Kuhn – according to his relativistic attitude – does not
think that these processes can be revealed.
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of evolution in a non-neopositivistic/non–Neo-Darwinian, in-
deed ’Kuhnian’ way, as it is done by the cybernetic and system-
theoretical approaches but not by Kuhn himself. Otherwise, the
Darwinian support for Kuhn’s science-development model will
be necessarily limited and controversial, and thus we cannot re-
gard Kuhn as a proper Darwinian.
Of course, in another paper we could examine Kuhn’s inter-
pretation of the Darwinian theory in connection with not just
his goal-directedness but, for example, with cumulativeness, in-
commensurability, and relativism as well. I suspect we would
find in all such cases that Kuhn is committed to a traditional,
neopositivistic interpretation of all these different notions.
However, if we try to support Kuhn’s science-development
model with the cybernetic and system-theoretical interpretation
of the Darwinian evolutionary theory which does justice to Dar-
win, we might solve some problems and contradictions and re-
move the limits of the standard Kuhnian interpretation. But, of
course, such a reinterpretation of Kuhn’s work leads to a signif-
icantly different science-development model as Kuhn’s own.
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